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Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happen-
ings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the
right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the
best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cog-
nitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning.
A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But
to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible
worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual
stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far
from it. I’ll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind
proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the
model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out,
requires novel metaphysical resources.
1. Impossible Worlds
Impossible worlds are worlds according to which impossible things happen. If a
world represents that such-and-such, and it is impossible that such-and-such, then
that is an impossible world. Impossible worlds (just like possible worlds) earn their
keep in a theory based on the theoretical work they do for us. If impossible worlds
are set-theoretic constitutions from actual entities (as I will argue here), then they
exist whether we like it or not. So the interesting question is why it is philosophically
worthwhile to discuss their logical and metaphysical nature. A worlds-based account
provides the best account of epistemic and doxastic notions of content, including
knowledge and belief states (Hintikka 1962), cognitive significance and information
(Chalmers 2010; Jago 2009), and the content of informative deduction (Jago 2013b).
As these are all hyperintensional notions, drawing distinctions between logically
equivalent contents, those stories must include impossible as well as possible worlds.
Similarly, a worlds-based account provides the best semantics for counterfac-
tuals (Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968). Yet to make good sense of counter-possible
conditionals, whose antecedents could not have been true, we require impossible as
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well as possible worlds to be part of the story (Brogaard and Salerno 2008; Nolan
1997; Read 1995; Routley 1989). Some counter-possible conditionals, such as
(1) If Linear Logic had been the One True Logic, then the TONK rules would
have been valid rules of inference;
(2) If Fermat’s Last Theorem had been false, then I would have been a lemon;
are clearly false (not trivially true, as the Stalnaker-Lewis approach tells us). On
a worlds-based approach, such truths require worlds where the antecedent is true
and the consequent is false. Such worlds are, of course, impossible. Hence the need
for impossible worlds in a non-trivial theory of counter-possibles.
(Just how we should think of similarity between impossible worlds is not at
all clear, but then again, neither is it clear how we should think about similarity
between possible worlds; see Nolan 1997. An attractive idea is that, for any possible
world w, any impossible world is further from w than any possible world is from
w. Then impossible worlds will not interfere with the evaluation at possible worlds
of counterfactuals with possible antecedents.)
One can of course resist these moves in various ways. One could flatly deny that
epistemic and counterfactual concepts are hyperintensional. Perhaps we really do
know all consequences of what we know, and perhaps counter-possible conditionals
are always trivially true. Lewis (1996) and Stalnaker (1984) defend this view. Stal-
naker in particular is at pains to explain away the appearance of hyperintensionality
via a metalinguistic approach. But this is implausible in general: my failure to know
how best to proceed in this game of chess is not a failure to grasp what certain
words mean. Alternatively, one could supplement a possible worlds-based account
of these notions with linguistic structure, rather than impossible worlds. Chalmers
(2011), Cresswell (1985), King (2007), Salmon (1986) and Soames (1987) take this
option. But such approaches do not suffice for, as Frege-problems show, there exist
hyperintensional differences without structural differences Ripley (2012).
One might even abandon worlds-based approaches altogether. This last option is
extreme. Hyperintensionality worries aside, the world-based approach is the most
comprehensive and systematic account of content on offer. It is one of the key
theories in formal semantics and is used widely in computer science, artificial
intelligence and game theory. We should not abandon the benefits that the theory
brings lightly. As always in science, the rational approach is to begin with our
best theory, and modify it so as to avoid phenomena which it does not currently
accommodate.
For the remainder of the paper, therefore, I will assume that there is desirable
theoretical utility to be gained from working with impossible as well as possible
worlds. The key question then is, just what are impossible worlds? For some authors,
they are worlds which represent some contradiction ‘A∧ ¬A’ as being true (Lycan
1994; Berto 2010). Typically, on this view, the impossible worlds correspond to
the relational models of paraconsistent logic (see, e.g., Priest 1987). For others,
impossible worlds are worlds governed by some non-classical (e.g., intuitionistic)
logic (Cresswell 1973). A far less constrained notion allows that, if it is impossible
that A, then there is a world which represents that A (Nolan 1997; Priest 2005).
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Going further still, one might allow (as Priest 2005 does) that, for any arbitrary
set of sentences in some specified language, there’s a world which represents all
and only those propositions as being true. In order to provide all the fine-grained
contents we require, we should accept this latter option. Accordingly, I will develop
a position along these lines in §5.
These remarks concern the granularity of worlds, the question of whether they
may be arbitrarily fine-grained representations, rather than their ontological status.
Some argue that we don’t need a specific answer to the ontological question in
the case of impossible worlds. Graham Priest claims that ‘any of the main theories
concerning the nature of possible worlds can be applied equally to impossible
worlds’ (Priest 1997, 580). One main aim of this paper is to argue that this is
not so. I’ll argue that none of the main theories of possible worlds found in the
literature can be extended naturally to make good sense of impossible worlds. The
metaphysics of impossible worlds is a pressing issue. Having argued that current
theories of possible worlds do not extend to impossible worlds, my second main
aim in the paper is to construct a theory of worlds which allows for impossible as
well as possible worlds.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In §2, I argue that impossible worlds
cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis (1986), McDaniel (2004)
or Yagisawa (1988; 2010). In §3, I argue that impossible worlds cannot be ersatz
worlds on the model proposed by Melia (2001) or Sider (2002). I present a solution
in §4 and finally, in §5, I show how to construct worlds (possible and impossible)
using the resources from §4.
2. Genuine Worlds
We might take non-actual worlds to exist in much the same way that our own
world—the universe in its entirety—exists. I’ll call such worlds genuine worlds.
Lewis (1973; 1986) is the main proponent of this view in the case of possible
worlds; Yagisawa (1988; 2010) is its champion in the case of impossible (as well as
possible) worlds. An opposing actualist view holds that the non-actual worlds are
mere representations, or models, of the ways our universe could or could not have
been. (Genuine worlds are also representations of ways things could or could not
be, but they are not mere representations. They do not represent in a pictorial or
linguistic way, as ersatz words do.) There are many of varieties of ersatz world on
offer to the theorist, depending on how she wants to represent those ways.
A third alternative, taking a cue from Bolzano (1834) and Meinong (1904), is
to accept that there are worlds other than our own but deny that such worlds exist
(Priest 2005). I shan’t discuss this Meinongian view here. Even setting aside worries
about its coherence, there remains the question of whether those non-existent, non-
actual worlds are genuine or ersatz in the above sense. Presumably they are not
ersatz set-theoretic constructions, since all such constructions exist. If genuine, and
genuine worlds are the best theoretical tool for the job, then I’d prefer to say that
such entities exist.
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It is best not to think of the difference between genuine and ersatz worlds as being
between concrete and abstract entities. We need worlds to represent mathematical
impossibilities (e.g. that 0 = 1), impossible properties (e.g. being a round square)
and other impossible abstract matters. So it cannot be that worlds vary only on
concrete matters (as Lewis’s worlds do). Consequently, we do well not to define
genuine worlds as maximal fusions of spatiotemporally related concrete entities.
What marks a world as genuine or ersatz is how that world represents. A genuine
world represents the existence of a flying hippo by having a flying hippo as a part.
That hippo is a real flesh-and-blood flying animal, the kind you could bump into
if you weren’t careful. More generally, such worlds represent de dicto that A by
being such that A. Genuine worlds are committed to the existence of non-actual
entities, such as flying hippos. Ersatz worlds, by contrast, represent the existence
of a flying hippo by picturing, or linguistically describing, a flying hippo. Ersatz
worlds are compatible with the actualist slogan that nothing exists but what actually
exists.
Lewisian genuine worlds obey the exportation principle: if world w represents
something as being an F , then something is an F . For if a genuine world w
represents something as being F , then w contains an F as a part. And as w is
part of the totality of being, that particular F too is part of the totality of being:
so something is an F . The exportation principle is problematic for any account
of impossible genuine worlds, as Lewis (1986) notes. Exporting merely possible
entities (or states of affairs) from genuine possible worlds lumbers us with a large
and counterintuitive but still consistent ontology. Exporting impossible entities
(or states of affairs) from genuine impossible worlds, by contrast, drags us into
contradiction. If there is an impossible genuine world according to which there is
a round square, then (given exportation) there is a real entity which is both round
and square, and hence round and not round: contradiction! So one cannot accept
impossible genuine worlds on the Lewisian model.
Yagisawa (1988) tries to bite the bullet here. He holds that ‘there are possible
worlds in Lewis’ sense and also impossible worlds in an equally realistic sense’
(1988, 176). He holds the dialethist position (in his 1988 paper), on which there
are true contradictions, so that one can ‘tell the truth about an impossible thing’
(such as our round square) by contradicting oneself (Yagisawa 1988, 203). But
merely allowing for true contradictions is not enough to alleviate the worry. Even
dialethists want to maintain that many sentences are not true. They make use of a
paraconsistent logic, which does not support ex falso quodlibet, A,¬AB. The very
point of rejecting this principle is to allow some contradictions to be true, without
triviality.
If we can export contradictions from impossible worlds, however, every sentence
will be true (simpliciter). Consider any sentence ‘A’ and some impossibility ‘Fx’.
Then there is an impossible world such that A∧ Fx. If that world is genuine, we can
export a genuine xwhich is such that A∧ Fx, which (classically or paraconsistently)
entails that ‘A’ is true (simpliciter). Hence, absurdly, any ‘A’ whatsoever is true. This
is just the conclusion the dialethist wanted to avoid. So even dialethists cannot
accept genuine impossible worlds which support the exportation principle.
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Yagisawa, in his recent account of modality (Yagisawa 2010), provides an al-
ternative to the Lewisian conception of genuine worlds. He treats modality much
as as four-dimensionalists treat temporal matters, whereby entities exist and have
properties at a time t by having temporal stages at time t which have those proper-
ties (Lewis 1986). For Yagisawa, worlds are like times in this respect: entities exist
and have properties at a world w by having modal stages at world w which have
those properties. Bertie is actually beagle-shaped in virtue of having a beagle-shaped
actual-stage; he could have been portly in virtue of having a (merely) possible portly
world-stage; and he is necessarily canine because all of his world-stages are canine.
All of those world-stages (whether the world in question is actual, merely possible
or impossible) are genuine parts of reality: they are what we quantify over when
using our most unrestricted quantifier.
This approach does not avoid the exportation worry (Jago 2013a). On Yag-
isawa’s view, Bertie has properties-at-world-w in virtue of having w-stages with
those properties (just as in the temporal case, Bertie has properties-at-time-t in
virtue of having t-stages with those properties). His w-stage is portly, simpliciter;
that stage is intrinsically portly, even though Bertie (the collection of all his stages)
is not. So the possibility of Bertie’s being a portly beagle entails that there is a
portly beagle-stage, out there somewhere in modal space. That stage is intrinsically
portly, and not merely portly-at-w. But by the same token, the impossibility of
Bertie’s being a portly-and-not-portly beagle entails that there is an intrinsically
portly-and-not-portly beagle-stage, out there in (impossible) modal space. So some
existent entity is both portly and not portly (simpliciter), and we have not avoided
contradiction.
To avoid the exportation worry, one must deny the move from ‘according to
w, Ax’ to ‘something is such that Ax’. One way to do this is to insist that all
(or at least most) property possession is world-relative: x may be F-at-w but not
F-at-w′ (much as I am happy on Sunday but not on Monday), with nothing being
F simpliciter. (In particular, on this view, x is not F-at-w in virtue of having a
w-stage that is intrinsically F , as on Yagisawa’s view. World-stages can play no role
in this relational theory.) Then, if it is impossible that A, we may infer that there is a
world w which represents that A, and hence that there something such that A-at-w.
But we cannot infer from this that there is something such that A (simpliciter). We
cannot infer that there exists a round square, but only that something is round-
and-square-at-w (for some impossible world w). McDaniel (2004) defends a view
along these lines.
Transposed to the temporal case, the view is precisely what the three-
dimensionalist says: objects do not have temporal parts; each object is wholly
present at each time. On the modal analogue, each object is wholly present at each
world in which it exists. A feature of this account is that one and the same entity
may exist according to many worlds, for that entity may bear the exists-at rela-
tion to more than one world. Because of this feature, the view is sometimes called
genuine modal realism with overlap (McDaniel 2004).
This approach is just as unsuited for impossible worlds as Lewis’s and Yagisawa’s,
although for a different reason. Suppose to the contrary that impossible worlds are
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of the realist-with-overlap variety, and take the case of Richard Sylvan, the New
Zealand logician, born Richard Routley. It is impossible for Routley to be other than
Sylvan, and hence impossible for Routley but not Sylvan to be a logician. So there
is an impossible world w according to which Routley but not Sylvan is a logician.
On the overlap view, that is to say that Routley, but not Sylvan, bears the being a
logician relation to world w. So, on this view, Routley bears a relation to w which
Sylvan does not bear to w and hence, by Leibniz’s law, Routley and Sylvan are not
identical (simpliciter). But this is absurd: Routley is (or was) Sylvan! Consequently,
overlapping genuine worlds are not a suitable treatment of impossible worlds.
In summary, neither Lewis’s nor Yagisawa’s nor McDaniels’s worlds are suitable
candidates for being impossible worlds. Impossible worlds are not genuine worlds
(at least, I know of no other account of genuine worlds but these). We need to
look elsewhere to get our fill of impossibility. Impossible worlds must be treated as
ersatz worlds.
3. Ersatz Worlds
Ersatz worlds have a clear advantage over genuine worlds when it comes to impos-
sibilities, for they do not require anything to be impossible or to possess impossible
properties (either simpliciter or at-a-world). They are mere representations, and
mere representations of impossibility are commonplace. (Just look at an Escher
drawing or read the Bible.) Given that we require very fine-grained impossible
worlds to make sense of the content of epistemic and doxastic states, the linguistic
approach is the way to go. Impossibilities may be incomplete as well as inconsistent,
and linguistic representation accounts for incompleteness far better than pictorial
representation does. So I will focus on the linguistic approach to constructing ersatz
worlds. (Such proposals were put forward, in different ways and for different pur-
poses, by Carnap (1947); Hintikka (1962; 1969), Jeffrey (1983) and, more recently,
by Melia (2001) and Sider (2002).)
On the linguistic approach, ersatz worlds are sets of sentences in some ‘world-
making’ language. This can be any language we like, as long as some important
constraints are met. First, we need a method of interpreting sentences of the lan-
guage, so that we can say what a given sentence represents. Second, the language
should be disambiguated and precise, so that it is always a determinate matter
what a given sentence represents. Third, the language must be expressible enough
to represent all the possible and impossible situations we want to represent, and to
represent distinct (possible or impossible) situations as distinct situations.
The first two desiderata can be met in a number of ways. Lewis (1986, 145–6),
following Carnap (1947), suggests the Lagadonian approach, according to which we
take particulars to be the names of our language, and properties and relations to
be our predicates, each interpreted to refer to itself. Atomic sentences are sequences
of an n-place predicate (that is, a property or relation) followed by n terms (partic-
ulars). Designated set-theoretic constructions will serve as connectives, quantifiers
and variables. We allow quantifier-prefixes to be infinitely long and our conjunction
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and disjunction symbols to operate on (possibly infinite) sets of sentences, resulting
in infinitely long conjunctions and disjunctions.
In this way, we avoid the cardinality objection from Lewis (1973,90) and Bricker
(1987, 340–3). The objection, in short, is that there are more possibilities (at
least 2) than sets of sentences (at most 1), and hence sets of sentences cannot
represent all the possibilities without conflation. But the objection assumes a count-
able worldmaking language, and so it is ineffective against the above proposal.
The third desideratum, that the language represent distinct (possible or im-
possible) situations without conflation, is much harder to meet. This ‘problem of
descriptive power’ is ‘an apparently devastating problem’ for linguistic ersatzism
(Sider 2002, 281). The problem is to represent possible but non-actual particulars,
properties and relations without conflation. Since (by actualist assumptions) such
entities do not exist, they cannot be invoked as names for themselves. So, it seems,
we cannot represent such mere possibilities by naming them.
We can instead describe them, by saying: there are properties and relations
X1, . . . , Xn and particulars x1, . . . , xm such that A (Skyrms 1981). Yet this approach
does not distinguish between what are intuitively distinct possibilities. Bec could
have done all Anna did and vice versa and, intuitively, this remains the case even
if Anna and Bec are merely possible. Yet descriptive worldmaking sentences will
not distinguish between these role-switched situations. Similarly, pairs of possible
properties could switch roles and yet, if those properties are merely possible, we
have just the one worldmaking sentence to describe them (Lewis 1986, 162).
The argument just given assumes haecceitism (Kaplan 1975) in the case of
particulars and quidditism (Black 2000) in the case of properties. One may deny
both. (Lewis (1986) denies haecceitism and dispositional essentialists such as Bird
(2007) and Shoemaker (1980) reject quidditism. Heller (1998), who treats properties
counterpart-theoretically, also rejects quidditism.) This denial amounts to the claim
that each possible property and particular is identified essentially with its role. But
consider Wonda, who is wondering whether electrons play this or that role (perhaps
it is possible, for all she knows, that electrons have neutral charge). To account for
the content of her epistemic state, we need to represent a situation in which elec-
trons do not play the electron-role. The status of quidditism affects whether this
situation is possible or impossible, yet we need to represent it regardless. Similarly,
Wonda may wonder which role unicornhood (or any other alien property) plays. So,
in considering how expressive our worldmaking language needs to be, one’s take
on quidditism (and haecceitism) is beside the point.
Meeting the third desideratum, by solving the problem of descriptive power,
is crucial for any ersatz worldmaking language. Melia (2001) and Sider (2002)
offer solutions (for the case of possible worlds only). Their solutions utilise similar
strategies and so, for brevity, I will discuss Sider’s approach only here. His idea is
to replace a plurality of ersatz worlds with a single ersatz pluriverse sentence (in the
worldmaking language), which has the form of a quantifier-prefix:
There are worldsw1, w2, . . . , non-actual particulars x1, x2, . . . and non-actual properties
X1, X2, . . . such that
8 NOUˆS
followed by a conjunction of world-conjuncts ‘. . . wi . . .’, each of the form ‘x1 exists
in wi , has property X2, and ...’.
Each world-conjunct fully describes a possible world. And crucially, the quanti-
fiers occur only in the prefix. Because of this, it is easy to say that there are distinct
properties F and G, and that everything that is F in w1 is G in w2 and vice versa.
Sider has given us a single description of all of modal space, rather than a sepa-
rate description for each ersatz world. What pluriverse sentences represent is none
other than a plurality of genuine possible worlds. (In this respect, Sider’s approach
bears some similarities to Rosen’s modal fictionalism (1990).) If successful, Sider
has shown how to reap the benefits of Lewis’s pluriverse without accepting Lewis’s
ontology of non-actual entities.
Can Sider’s ersatz pluriverse approach be extended to include impossible as
well as possible worlds? It faces a painful dilemma: either the extended pluriverse
sentence represents implicitly by entailment, or it represents explicitly by containing
an appropriate sentence as a conjunct. Inconsistent world-conjuncts trivialise the
former approach. An inconsistent world-conjunct entails every ‘A’, so that no
two inconsistent world-conjuncts differ in what they represent. But worse, such
a pluriverse sentence S will represent that A for any ‘A’ whatsoever and so will
grossly misrepresents both the possibilities and the impossibilities. In particular, an
extended pluriverse sentence cannot represent (by entailment) a structured space of
impossible worlds, and hence cannot be used in a theory of epistemic contents or
counter-possible conditionals. So, if we are to extend Sider’s approach to represent
impossibilities, the extended pluriverse sentence cannot represent by entailment.
(Note that it would not help if the extended pluriverse sentence were to represent
by some non-classical notion of entailment. If ‘A’ entails ‘B’ under that notion of
entailment, then a world that represents that A will also represent that B. But it
might be impossible that A and not B, in which case, there should be a world which
represents that A but does not represent that B. This point is crucial if we are
to capture fine-grained epistemic contents and counter-possible conditionals using
impossible worlds.)
Suppose instead that the extended pluriverse sentence S represents explicitly. S
says that there’s a world such that A if ‘A’ (expressed in the worldmaking language)
is a conjunct of some world-conjunct of S. This move avoids the trivialisation worry
just discussed. But now, if any ‘A’ is to be a necessary truth, it must be a conjunct
of every world-conjunct. This raises cardinality worries. If set X exists and W is
a world-conjunct, then X necessarily exists and so ‘X exists’ must be a conjunct
of W. That goes for every set X. If W is a set-theoretic construction, as is usually
assumed, then it must have itself as a conjunct.
This contradicts the axiom of regularity, which implies that sets are no set is
a member of itself. (There do exist non-well-founded set theories (Aczel 1988),
but these are non-standard. It is pure hubris to think that the correct theory of
content should dictate what set theory should look like!) If world-conjuncts are
to represent the mathematical universe explicitly (and if sentences are set-theoretic
constructions), then world-conjuncts are ‘too big’ to be sets. They are proper classes.
But by definition, no proper class is a member of another class, and so cannot be
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conjoined into a quantifier-prefixed pluriverse sentence. So there can be no extended
pluriverse sentence that represents explicitly.
Could we escape the dilemma by taking the possible-world-conjuncts to rep-
resent implicitly and the impossible-world-conjuncts to represent explicitly? No,
we cannot. Consider a situation just like the actual state of affairs (mathematical
universe included) which, in addition, contains a round square. That is impossible,
and so there should be an impossible world representing it fully. But the situation
contains all sets, so cannot be represented explicitly by a worldmaking sentence
qua set-theoretic construction. However we define representation, there can be no
extended pluriverse sentence that incorporates impossible-world conjuncts.
I have argued that, contrary to Priest’s claim (1997, 580), it is not the case that
‘any of the main theories concerning the nature of possible worlds can be applied
equally to impossible worlds’. Far from it: no theory of genuine worlds, and none
of the current theories of ersatz worlds which overcome the problem of descriptive
power, can be extended to impossible worlds. In the next two sections, I develop an
ersatz theory of worlds which overcomes this deficiency.
4. Naming the Possibilities
So far, I have argued that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds and that
descriptive ersatz approaches, although suited to building impossible worlds, nev-
ertheless conflate what should be distinct (possible or impossible) situations. The
moral I draw is that (i) impossible worlds must be ersatz worlds; but (ii) possibili-
ties must be represented referentially, rather than descriptively. Each merely possible
particular, property and relation requires a distinct name.
If we continue strictly with the Lagadonian approach, on which each entity
denotes itself, then (ii) amounts to the requirement that non-actual entities genuinely
exist. This requires an ontology of possibilia, much like Lewis’s. Since impossible
worlds cannot be genuine worlds (§2), one option to adopt a Lewisian account of
possible worlds and use the possibilia they contain to construct ersatz impossible
worlds (in the Lagadonian way). This is the view Berto (2010) calls hybrid modal
realism. On this option, the genuine worlds provide enough non-actual entities for
us to represent by name all the possibilities without conflation: they are ‘the basic
stuff’ of the world-building enterprise (Berto 2010, 481). Impossible words are then
constructed in some ersatz way, using those possibilist resources.
The view suffers from a serious lack of economy. Suppose we grant that Sider’s er-
satz pluriverse approach does a good job of representing Lewis’s ersatz pluriverse. If
we constrain our interest to analysing intensional (as opposed to hyperintensional)
content, then Sider’s and Lewis’s approaches do an equally good job. It is when we
turn to hyperintensional contents that Sider’s view suffers (§3). So Lewisian non-
actual possibilia are not strictly required in the analysis of possible worlds; it is the
analysis of impossible worlds that (on the hybrid view) requires them. But this is
incredible! If we can construct possible worlds without using exotic non-actual enti-
ties, then we should not require exotic non-actual entities to account for impossible
worlds. At the least, these considerations undermine the motivation for accepting
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non-actual possibilia in the first place and hence undermine the motivation for
hybrid modal realism.
An alternative approach to Berto’s hybrid modal realism, which affords much the
same flexibility, is to adopt Platonic universals into one’s ontology. On this view,
universals may exist even if uninstantiated. An ‘alien’ property, such as having
1
4 charge, is not ruled out of existence. One can then use a broadly Lagadonian
approach to constructing worlds, with each property naming itself. How should
one represent non-actual particulars on this approach? One option is to accept
haecceitistic Platonic universals, such as the property of being Bob Dylan and (the
uninstantiated) being Sherlock Holmes. One can then treat such properties as names
in the worldmaking language.
I find haecceitistic properties wonderfully obscure. It is highly improbable that
there exists a distinct fundamental universal for each existent particular, let alone
the non-existent ones. That view would require that the fundamental truths about
reality make reference not only to electrons, quarks and so on, but also to you and
I, Bob Dylan and Sherlock Holmes. This is unreasonable. One might instead take
haecceitistic properties to be non-fundamental and hence decomposable into more
basic universals. But that view suffers from the problems of the property-bundle
approach to representing particulars (§3): distinct possibilities will be conflated.
The objection shows that genuine haecceities cannot be defined qualitatively and
hence cannot be treated as property-bundles.
What if one cares about quidditistic differences but not haecceitistic differences
between possibilities? Then one could ditch bizarre haecceities and yet stick with
the proposal in terms of uninstantiated Platonic universals. This view overcomes
the problem of descriptive power and is plausible, so long as one is happy to ac-
cept uninstantiated Platonic universals. My concern here is that it is hard to find
independent motivation for accepting uninstantiated Platonic universals into one’s
view. Uninstantiated universals would not be required at all were we to ignore
worries about hyperintensionality. It is incredible that uninstantiated Platonic uni-
versals should be needed just to account for hyperintensional content, just as it is
incredible that Lewisian worlds should be needed solely for that purpose. Perhaps
uninstantiated Platonic universals (or Lewisian worlds) can be kept as a back-up
option, but I would strongly prefer to do without them.
We cannot name the possibilities (without conflation) without some serious
additions to ‘ordinary’ ontology. What one would like is a serious independent
motivation for any such addition to one’s ontology. I’ve argued elsewhere in favour
of one such addition to ‘ordinary’ ontology: the addition of facts (or states of
affairs), including negative facts (Barker and Jago 2012). This move affords us a
way to name non-actual properties (as I’ll argue below) and it has independent
motivation. But negative facts are controversial beasts indeed. One needs good
reason for accepting their existence. Here, I can indicate how that argument would
go only briefly.
It is often said that postulated physical entities ‘should make some sort
of causal/nomic contribution to the working of the actual world’ (Armstrong
2004, 39), and this this thought is often used int he case against negative facts
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(Molnar 2000). But if we grant the premise and can show that they do contribute
to the make-up of the world, then we have a reason for accepting negative facts.
Negative facts (qua real absences, which I identify with negative existential facts)
plausibly play a role in causation, as when Bob’s not watering his plants causes
them to die. They plausibly play a role in the material constitution of holes, gaps,
edges and the like, and consequently in the material constitution of entities such
as ring-donuts (for which the hole is an essential part!). It’s plausible that we can
perceive facts (we see that such-and-such is the case) and, if so, it’s plausible that
some negative facts are amongst the perceivable facts. On this (causal) view of per-
ception, I see that the room is empty, or that there’s a gap at mid-on, when I stand
in an appropriate causal relation to the fact that the room is empty or that there’s a
gap at mid-on.
I’ve argued for all of these claims in more detail elsewhere (Barker and Jago
2012). But there’s a further, independent motivation for believing in negative facts:
the demand for truthmakers for all the truths. It’s highly plausible that at least
some truths (the ‘positive’ ones) require truthmakers. Yet as I argue elsewhere (Jago
2012), if we need truthmakers for positive truths, then we need truthmakers for
‘negative’ truths such as ‘there are no Vulcans’ too. Truthmaker theorists should
be truthmaker maximalists, who provide truthmakers for all truths. But most max-
imalist accounts fail (Jago forthcoming). The best maximalist solution, in my view,
is to accept an ontology of positive and negative facts. Each step in this chain of
reasoning requires careful, detailed argument, and here isn’t the place to repeat
that reasoning. The salient point here is that there exists independent and (I claim)
plausible motivation for accepting negative facts into one’s ontology.
How are we to get from the acceptance of negative facts to a worldmaking
language which names non-actual entities (without conflation)? We will require that
each fact is associated (perhaps primitively) with some particulars and properties,
which exist if that fact does. Specifically, a fact that Fa must be associated with the
property λx Fx and the fact that ¬Fb must be associated with the property λx¬Fx.
One option here is to take facts to be primitive, fundamental entities (Skyrms
1981) from which properties may be abstracted (Armstrong 2004) or otherwise
constructed. (Abstraction here is not a mental process: the relation between facts
and properties should be a mind-independent phenomenon. Just how abstraction
is to work needn’t detain us here: see Jago (2011) for one account.)
Alternatively, one could take facts to be comprised (in some non-mereological
way) of particulars and properties (Armstrong 1997). A third option is to take
facts, particulars and properties to be equally metaphysically basic, with primitive
relations of association between (e.g.) F , a and the fact that a is F . All that the
present argument requires is that one can infer from the existence of the fact to the
existence of the associated property.
Now return to the pressing problem of representing alien properties: how are
we to represent the property having 14 charge? Nothing possesses this property.
In particular, for any fundamental entity a, a doesn’t possess having 14 charge.
So, on the current approach, there exists a fact that a lacks 14 charge and hence
an associated (abstracted) property λx x lacks 14 charge. We use this as a predicate
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in our worldmaking language, interpreted in the Lagadonian way so as to mean
lacking 14 charge. Now let’s add to our worldmaking language a predicate-negation
symbol NEG. We stipulate that any predicate (NEG, (NEG, F)) represents whatever
F represents and that F represents lacking G iff (NEG, F) represents having G.
Consequently, (NEG, λx x lacks 14 charge) represents having
1
4 charge: precisely the
property we wanted to represent!
We can reason similarly with any fundamental alien property in place of having 14
charge. For suppose that Fness is a possible fundamental property. Then (for some
fundamental x), I claim that there exists either a fundamental fact that x is F or a
fundamental fact that x isn’t F. (This is justified by accepting that the fundamental
facts are truthmakers for such claims and that all such truths require a truthmaker.)
Whichever of these facts exists, we can use the technique just described to represent
Fness unambiguously. (For the technical details, see Jago 2011.)
I’ve indicated some independent reasons for accepting negative facts and given
one way in which they can be used to represent alien properties. That’s progress,
but it doesn’t give us all we want. It remains to be shown that, having used negative
facts to represent alien properties, we can then represent all target possible and
impossible situations without conflation. That is the task of the next section.
5. Constructing Worlds
In the previous section, I argued that thinking in terms of positive and negative
facts (with properties abstracted from those facts) allows us to name alien properties
unambiguously and without conflation. Yet representing all the possible properties
is just one of the theoretical problems facing the construction of ersatz worlds.
There remains the issue of representing possible particulars; and beyond that, we
need to represent impossible situations. Let’s consider each problem in turn.
I want to revisit the idea, from §3, of representing non-actual particulars using
property-bundles. Since we have named all the possible properties, we can help
ourselves to any bundle of possible properties. But, as we saw in §3, using property-
bundles qua definite descriptions to represent possibilia forces us to conflate what
should be distinct possibilities. These are possibilities which are qualitatively indis-
tinguishable, but with different particulars playing the relevant roles.
I propose that we represent such possibilia using property-bundles, interpreted in
line with proper names and demonstratives rather than definite descriptions. To see
the picture, let’s temporarily adopt a possibilist fiction by pretending that all possible
particulars exist. A property-bundle qua worldmaking name n = {F1, . . . , Fn} is
interpreted as denoting the unique F1 ∧· · ·∧ Fn. We then interpret worldmaking
sentences containing n as saying that that very entity is a certain way. The sentence
Gn says only that that entity is G: it does not attribute any of the bundle-properties
Fi to that entity. (As a consequence, the worldmaking sentence ¬Fin is consistent.)
The properties in the bundle pin down what the name n represents, but not how
it represents that entity as being. Semantically, n functions similarly to Kaplan’s
(1978)) ‘DTHAT(the F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn)’: it is non-attributive and semantically rigid.
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When we drop the possibilist fiction, we should no longer say that such
property-bundles refer, for there are no possibilia or fictional entities to which they
may refer. (For simplicity, I’ll continue to say that a bundle represents Sherlock
Holmes. By this, I mean only that that bundle, combined with a predicate F ,
represents that Sherlock is F.) Despite not referring, the semantic function of
these names-qua-bundles is unchanged: they contribute non-attributively to
representations. The properties in the name-qua-bundle fix its semantic value qua
subject term, but to use that name (in a worldmaking sentence) is not to predicate
those properties.
To see why this approach works, consider how the problem of descriptive power
has to be set up (§3). We first describe some possible situation involving non-
actual particulars. Then we say: that particular could have been such-and-such and
that other particular could have been so-and-so. We make as to refer back, non-
descriptively, to the particular previously described. If that way of setting up the
problem makes sense (and in particular, if it is coherent to make as to refer back
to something which, by actualist lights, doesn’t exist), then the line I’m proposing
is a genuine solution. If there’s something suspect to the idea of rigidly and non-
descriptively representing that thing (which, as it happens, doesn’t exist), on the
other hand, then the description of the problem too is nonsensical. I say there
is a genuine problem and that using property-bundles as semantically rigid, non-
attributive worldmaking names solves the problem.
This approach is particularly useful for dealing with fictional entities such as
Sherlock Holmes. The worldmaking name h representing Holmes is a property-
bundle {is a detective, lives at 221b Baker Street, is a cocaine addict, . . .}. As Conan
Doyle wrote the novels, he associated the English name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ with h,
by virtue of ascribing the properties F ∈ h to Holmes. He did not create an abstract
entity (how could he?); neither did he describe someone of whom it is a priori that
he is a detective living in 221b Baker Street. It is coherent to think that Holmes
lived elsewhere, or that he was a chemist, or that he did all Watson was said to have
done and vice versa.
We can represent this latter situation consistently only if our worldmaking names
for Holmes and Watson are non-attributive. The semantically rigid property-bundle
approach deals with these situations well. (It may be that none of these Holmes-
involving situations are metaphysically possible (Kripke 1980). I remain neutral
on the issue: my concern is to represent a range of situations, including Holmes-
involving situations, possible or otherwise.)
We must also address the question of representing impossible situations. Logical
impossibility requires logical structure: no logical impossibility is logically primitive.
Since our worldmaking language contains logical vocabulary (connectives, variables
and quantifiers), the language can represent the structure of any logically impossi-
ble situation. If we can represent a’s being F , for example, then we can represent a
situation in which a is both F and not-F . Similarly for logically complex metaphys-
ically impossible situations such as Bill’s being a married bachelor. Since we can
represent each conjunct of this conjunctive situation and conjoin them in the world-
making language, it is easy to represent Bill’s impossible situation. Perhaps there
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are logically primitive but metaphysically impossible situations: Holmes-involving
situations might be such cases (Kripke 1980). Even if so, no problem. We have the
resources to represent such entities de re, using semantically rigid, non-attributive
property-bundles.
The worldmaking language described so far has a serious shortcoming. As one
can think about a given entity under various guises (and we want to reflect this at the
level of content), we must allow for there to be distinct contents relating to one and
the same entity. One may believe that Hesperus is F but not believe that Phosphorus
is F , and so we need to distinguish between the contents that Hesperus is F and
that Phosphorus is F . If these contents are distinct, then the worldmaking sentences
representing that Hesperus is F and that Phosphorus is F must also be distinct.
Yet at present, we have only one name for Venus in our worldmaking language,
namely Venus itself. So we have only a single worldmaking sentence representing
(by name) that Hesperus is F and that Phosphorus is F . (We can also denote Venus
by definite description. But definite descriptions are attributive and so, for certain
Fs, sentences describing Venus will always say more than that Hesperus is F .)
The most promising response to this worry is to replace in the worldmaking
language all Lagadonian names with non-attributive property-bundles, all of which
uniquely pick out the particular in question. On this approach, all worldmaking
names are property-bundles, irrespective of whether the supposed referent exists.
There will in general be multiple such names-qua-bundles for each actual particu-
lar. When distinct names qua property-bundles are uniquely satisfied by the same
particular, those names co-refer and thus give us distinct ways of representing (by
name) one and the same individual.
A worry remains, however. Our worldmaking names corresponding to ‘Hesperus’
and ‘Phosphorus’ represent the same particular, Venus, because those names are
each property-bundles uniquely satisfied by Venus. But not so for the worldmaking
names corresponding to ‘Superman’, ‘Clark Kent’, ‘Pegasus’, ‘Darth Vader’ and
so on. Each such property-bundle does not pick out any actual particular. Yet one
might well want to say that, in some sense, the English names ‘Superman’ and
‘Clark Kent’ represent the same thing (in a way that ‘Superman’ and ‘Darth Vader’
do not). If so, we should say likewise for the corresponding worldmaking names.
But the approach I’ve described so far does not allow us to say this. We can say
that, according to some world w, Superman is Clark Kent; but we cannot say that
the worldmaking names corresponding to ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ represent
the same person, simpliciter.
The best response to the worry is to deny that those worldmaking names co-
represent. Co-representation is possible only in the case of names for existent
entities, on this view: worldmaking names B1 and B2 co-represent just in case
some particular uniquely satisfies both property bundles. As a consequence, dis-
tinct worldmaking names for fictional entities will never co-represent. Nevertheless,
it remains true that, according to the Superman stories, Superman is Clark Kent.
These stories represent that Superman is Clark Kent; another story may (consis-
tently) represent otherwise.
On the view I am suggesting, we can say something true using (English or
worldmaking) names such as ‘Superman’ only by using that-clauses (or equivalents
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such as ‘according to the fiction, . . . ’). It is true that Alice hopes that Santa will
come, that Bob wishes that Superman exists, and that the stories represent that
Superman is Clark Kent. But it is false that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ (or the
corresponding worldmaking names) represent something, and hence false that they
represent the same thing. One might object: surely each Superman story represents
the same superhero! This I must deny, for there is no such superhero. Instead, we
should say that the word ‘Superman’ has the same content and meaning in each
story. Moreover, we can treat all the Superman stories as a combined fiction, in
which ‘Superman’ has a consistent meaning (and according to which Superman
exists and does such-and-such).
If we suppose that this approach (or something like it) works, then we have
a good handle on how worldmaking sentences represent all that we want them
to represent. Ersatz worlds are then sets of worldmaking sentences. These worlds
represent by inclusion (and not by entailment). A world w represents that A iff there
is a worldmaking sentence S ∈ w which represents that A. To allow the maximum
of flexibility, I will count every non-empty set of worldmaking sentences as a world.
Consequently, many worlds are incomplete, both in the sense that (for some ‘A’) they
represent neither that A nor that ¬A, and in the sense that they may represent that
A, which entails that B, and yet fail to represent that B. Such a world may represent
that all men are mortal and represent that Bob is a man, yet fail to represent that
Bob is mortal. Both kinds of incompleteness are required in an adequate account
of impossible worlds, suitable for making sense of fine-grained contents.
We can classify worlds via a number of syntactic tests. A world is prime iff it
contains a disjunct of each disjunction it contains. A world ismaximal iff it contains
either ‘A’ or its negation, for each sentence ‘A’ (of the worldmaking language). A
world is logically possible (with respect to some logic L) iff it is closed under
L-consequence but does not contain every sentence of the worldmaking language.
Just when a world represents a genuine metaphysical possibility is a thorny issue,
and one I do not propose to say anything about here. Ersatzers typically resort to
primitive modal facts. That’s fine with me. My concern has been to represent all the
possible and impossible situations, not to give a reductive account of modal talk.
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